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1974

CASE COMMENTS

CRIMINAL LAW: CUMULATIVE SENTENCING FOR OFFENSES
WITHIN A SINGLE TRANSACTION
Edmond v. State, 280 So. 2d 449 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
287 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1973)
Defendant was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit
a felony, possession of burglary tools, and grand larceny. The trial court imposed consecutive maximum terms for each offense. Defendant appealed, assigning as error the imposition of sentences for the latter two counts. The appellate court reversed and HELD, where possession of burglary tools and
grand larceny constitute facets of a unitary criminal transaction culminating
in the offense of breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, the
trial court could impose only one sentence, which could not exceed the maximum term for the most serious charge proved.1
A single course of criminal conduct frequently comprehends more than
one statutory offense. It is settled law that a defendant may be tried for and
convicted of each offense committed during a criminal transaction,2 but there
is little agreement whether he may be sentenced for more than one such offense 3 or whether multiple sentences, if imposed, should be consecutive or
concurrent. 4 Some courts that impose multiple sentences for offenses within a
single transaction fail to distinguish cases in which the defendant has committed unrelated crimes, 5 citing public policy0 or the discretionary power of
common law courts in sentencing7 to justify this practice.
Some courts have recognized, however, that cumulative sentencing for offenses within the same transaction may impose excessive or arbitrary punishment,8 and a few states have enacted legislation that prohibits sentencing
under more than one statute for a single criminal transaction. 9 Other states

1. 280 So. 2d 449 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 287 So. 2d 690 (Fla. 1973).
2. Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973); State v. Willhite, 40 N.J. Super. 405, 123 A.2d
237 (Somerset & Morris County Ct., L. Div. 1956).
3. Compare Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 109 A.2d 89 (1954), with People v. Florio,
301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950).
4. Compare People ex rel. Maurer v. Jackson, 2 N.Y.2d 259, 140 N.E.2d 282 (1957), with
Williams v. State, 321 P.2d 990 (Crim. App. Okla. 1957), affd, 358 U.S. 576 (1958).
5. See, e.g., State v. Hutton, 87 Ariz. 176, 349 P.2d 187 (1960); Williams v. State, 205 Md.
470, 109 A.2d 89 (1954); State v. Byra, 128 N.J.L. 429, 26 A.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1942), af'd,
30 A.2d 49 (Ct. Err. & App. N.J. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 884 (1944); Rogerson v. Harris,
111 Utah 330, 178 P.2d 397 (1947).
6. Mead v. State, 489 P.2d 738, 743 (Alas. 1971).
7. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 205 Md. 470, 109 A.2d 89 (1954); State ex rel Meininger
v. Breuer, 304 Mo. 381, 264 S.W. 1 (1924). See also Sherman v. United States, 241 F.2d 329
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911, rehearingdenied, 355 U.S. 852 (1957); Ex parte Sabongy,
18 N.J. Super. 334, 87 A.2d 59 (1952).
8. Munson v. McClaughry, 198 F. 72 (8th Cir. 1912); Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 56 (1855)
(Waite, C.J. dissenting).
9. E.g., CAL. PEN. CoDE §654 (West 1970), which provides in part: "[A]n act ... which
is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this Code may be punished
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rely on a judicially created rule substantially the same as the single transaction
rule presently operative in Florida. 0 Federal courts, since Bell v. United
States," have been subject to the rule of lenity, which creates a presumption
against cumulative sentencing for offenses within the same transaction absent
evidence of congressional intent to the contrary.' 2 The intent of Congress has
not always been clear, however, so that federal courts often emasculate the rule
by finding, sometimes unconvincingly, an intent to punish cumulatively.-z
In Florida, punishment for offenses within the same transaction is limited
to the maximum sentence for the most serious offense proved.14 This "single
transaction rule" is of common law origin, and was concisely stated in the
1861 case of Cribb v. State: 5
We consider the rule to be that if all the counts are good, and such
as on which judgment can be awarded, and the evidence warrants the
conviction, to pass judgment on the count charging the highest grade of
offence ....
In addition to limiting the entry of judgment to the most serious offense, the
single transaction rule has been held to prohibit concurrent sentences for the
lesser offenses within the same transaction, 6 although the effect would be the
same as if only one sentence were imposed.
Only one Florida supreme court opinion appears in conflict with the single
transaction rule. In Steele v. Mayo" the court upheld the separate sentencing
of convictions of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny
and grand larceny, even though the two offenses were "two aspects of the same
transaction."' 8 This departure from the rule was followed in Footman v.

under either of such provisions, but in no case . . . under more than one." See also ILL
. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, §1005-8-4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. §609.035 (1963).
Note, however, that Minnesota specifically excepts any crime committed after completion
of a burglary from the statute's protection. Id. §609.535.
10. See, e.g., People v. Florio, 301 N.Y. 46, 92 N.E.2d 881 (1950); Commonwealth v.
Soudani, 398 Pa. 546, 159 A.2d 687 (1960).
11. 349 U.S. 81 (1955).
12. Id. See also Prince v. United States, 352 U.S. 322 (1957).
13. See, e.g., Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1957); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932); Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YA
L.J. 262, 313-21 (1965). Nor is it
always clear which acts fall within a single transaction. See also Irby v. United States, 390
F.2d 432, 432-42 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (Bazelon, C. J., dissenting). The matter is further complicated by the revival in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448-60 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring),
of the common law notion of "single transaction" as the equivalent of "offense" for purposes
of the double jeopardy clause. Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy
Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 364 (1956).
14. Cone v. State, 285 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1973); Williams v. State, 69 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1953);
Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942); Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
15. 9 Fla. 409, 416 (1861).
16. Simmons v. State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942).
17. 72 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1954).
18. Id.
R
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State 9 where the Second District Court of Appeal upheld separate sentences
for these same offenses on the ground that they were two distinct crimes and
therefore not part of the same criminal transaction. 20 The Second District,
however, receded from this position in Davis v. State,21 specifically because
Footman could be understood to imply that burglary and larceny were cumulatively punishable. 22 The Footman decision, nevertheless, served as unfortunate
precedent for other intermediate appellate courts.23 It is against this confused
background that the instant court sought to clarify the single transaction rule
and to reestablish within its scope the three offenses of which the defendant
was convicted.

24

The court framed the issue in terms of the relation between the single
transaction rule and legislative intent, finding the rule to be "presumptively
declarative" of that intent.25 The rule thus describes a judicial policy of
statutory interpretation, the effect of which is to limit the discretionary power
2
of the judge in sentencing. 6
The court found the justification for the single transaction rule to be
implicit in the policy underlying the legislature's creation of statutory crimes.
In order to make the criminal statutory scheme applicable to the many possible configurations of criminal conduct, the court declared that the legislature
had made each step in a given criminal transaction punishable.2 To the
same end, overlapping offenses were created with the result that more than
one offense may describe the same act. 28 For example, a defendant may be

statutorily convicted of both possession and sale of narcotics, even though
possession is a necessary incident to the sale.2 9 Similarly, unlawful dealing in
securities may be punished both as "sale of unregistered securities" and as
"sale of securities by an unregistered dealer," though the two offenses may

19. 203 So. 2d 356 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
20. Id. at 357. The Footman decision rested in part on Steele v. Mayo and in part on
the separation of the two offenses in two distinct chapters of the Florida statutes. FLA. STAT.
§§810.02, .021(2) (1971). The court in Footman also seemed to justify its result on the
ground that the Florida supreme court in Steele had somehow differentiated "aspects of the
same transaction" from "facets of the same transaction." See Footman v. State, 203 So. 2d
356, 357 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
21. 277 So. 2d 300 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
22. Id. at 306. The Davis court also made clear that the "same transaction" doctrine
could not "logically hinge upon the facile test of whether the two transactions fall within
the same chapter of the Florida Statutes ....
Id.
23. See Foster v. State, 276 So. 2d 512 (ist D.CA.), rev'd, 263 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1973);
White v. State, 274 So. 2d 6 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1973); State v. Conrad, 243 So. 2d 174 (4th
D.CA. Fla. 1971).
24. See 280 So. 2d at 453-54.
25. Id. at 450.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. See also Yost v. State, 243 So. 2d 469 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1971); FLA. STAT.
§§404.02(1)-(4) (1971).
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arise out of a single act. 30 The effect of such statutes is to ensure punishment
of the defendant for one offense if proof for another is unavailable. 31
Nevertheless, legislative intent to preclude escape from punishment does
not necessarily evidence an intent to impose multiple sentences for offenses
within a single criminal transaction; still less to impose such sentences in
pyramid fashion. 3 2 Rather, the assumption should be that the legislature, in
providing offenses to fit each facet of a criminal transaction, has considered
the possibility that one transaction might constitute the commission of more
than one crime within the same transaction and has set the maximum sentence
accordingly. 33 Proceeding on this assumption, the instant court found possession of burglary tools to be merely incidental to the greater transaction of
breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, much as possession of
34
narcotics is but an incident to their sale.
The court had greater difficulty deciding whether grand larceny should be
cumulatively punishable with the graver offense of breaking and entering with
intent to commit a felony. 35 Without defining "single transaction,"' 6 the court
offered three justifications for including these offenses within the scope of the
single transaction rule. There is, first, no historical evidence that the common
law crimes of burglary and larceny were cumulatively punishable.3 7 Although
early English cases recognized many artificial distinctions in order to make
successive prosecutions amenable to the rigid forms of pleading,38 these cases
in no wise sanction cumulative punishment for burglary and larceny. 39 The
modern English statutory formulation supports this historical interpretation,
as it appears to merge the two offenses at issue in the instant case.40

30.
Easton
31.
32.

280 So. 2d at 450. See also Sparks v. State, 256 So. 2d 537 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1971);
v. State, 250 So. 2d 294 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1971); FLA. STAT. §§517.07, .12 (1971).
280 So. 2d at 450.
Id.

33. Id. at 451.

34. Id. at 450. Thus, the defendant could not receive a sentence for possession of
burglary tools in addition to the more serious crime of breaking and entering.
35. Id. The court found grand larceny, like possession of burglary tools, to be incidental
to the breaking and entering under the facts of the instant case so as to invoke the sentencing
limitations of the single transaction rule. Although many of the arguments favoring inclusion of the crimes of possession of burglary tools within the single transaction rule have
equal validity with respect to the crime of grand larceny, the court felt compelled to explain why grand larceny and burglary should not be cumulatively punishable and thus
turned to a historical and functional analysis.
36. See id. However, in Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300, 305-06 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973), the
same court indicated that a single transaction would include acts necessary and incident to
the accomplishment of a given criminal objective: "[A]s to the breaking and entering and
petit larceny charges, it must be presumed that the perpetrator breaks and enters with a
purpose and that the accomplishment of that purpose [the petit larceny] can only be
classified as part of the same criminal act."
37. 280 So. 2d at 451.
38. Id. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 343.
39. 280 So. 2d at 451.
40. Id. See also Theft Act 1968, c. 60, §9 [England].
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Second, although some American cases uphold cumulative punishment for
burglary and larceny, 4 ' many do not express an unqualified approval of the
practice.42 Doubts expressed in Ex parte Peters,43 lead rather to the conclusion
that some cumulative sentences have been allowed to stand only because they
were less severe, in the aggregate, than the maximum sentence permitted for
the gravest offense within the transaction. 44 Steele v. Mayo 45 would also seem
to fit this pattern, especially when read in context with other Florida decisions. 46 Thus viewed, Peters and Steele are consonant with the purpose of the
single transaction rule: to curtail excessive sentences.
Further justification for including the crimes of grand larceny and breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony within the single transaction
rule is found in the Florida statutory scheme, which does not reveal an intent
Conviction of breaking
to impose cumulative punishment for these offenses
years, according to
or
fifteen
of
five
and entering carries maximum penalties
48
case, grand
the
instant
In
whether the intent is proved to be felonious.
more
serious ofthe
rea
for
larceny was proved, thereby establishing the mens
fense. The court refused to believe that the legislature intended to punish the
completed grand larceny in addition to the felonious breaking and entering,
which already carried with it a far more severe punishment than the less
serious offense.4 9 Had the legislature intended such a result it could have so
provided, as has, for example, the Missouri Legislature.50 The court concluded
that the legislative intent embodied in the Florida statutes demands conformity with those jurisdictions in which burglary and larceny are not cumulatively punishable.51
The instant court avoided any confusion of the protection afforded by the
single transaction rule with that afforded by the constitutional prohibition

41. See, e.g., Rogerson v. Harris, 111 Utah 830, 178 P.2d 897 (1947), which does not
distinguish between "same transaction" for purposes of conviction and for purposes of
sentencing.
42. See, e.g., Halligan v. Wayne, 179 F. 112 (9th Cir. 1910); Ex parte Peters, 12 F. 461
(C.C.W.D. Mo. 1880); Wilson v. State, 24 Conn. 56, 69 (1855) (Waite, C. J., dissenting).
43. 12 F. 461 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1880). See also Munson v. McClaughry, 198 F. 72, 74-75

(8th Cir. 1912).
44. See Ex partePeters, 12 F. 461, 464 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1880).
45. 72 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1954).

46. See, e.g., Young v. State, 69 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 1954) (where gambling offenses related
to the same transaction, there could be only one sentence and punishment, and the sentence
was to be imposed on the count charging the higher grade or degree of offense); Simmons v.
State, 151 Fla. 778, 10 So. 2d 436 (1942) (in interest of uniformity, court could not impose
concurrent sentences for offenses constituting different aspects of the same transaction, even
though practical effect would be the same as imposing one sentence for the highest offense
proved).
47. 280 So. 2d at 452.
48. FLA. STAT. §§810.02, .05 (1971).

49. 280 So. 2d at 452.
Mo. REv. STAT. §560.110 (1959), amending Mo. Rev. Stat. §560.110 (1957). See also
§609.585 (1963).
51. 280 So. 2d at 452.

50.

MINN. STAT. ANN.
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against double jeopardy. 52 Unlike the latter protection, the single transaction
rule shields a defendant from multiple punishment where there is no constitutional bar to such punishment. 53 The court also emphasized that the
judicial power to subject a defendant to successive prosecutions does not permit the imposition of cumulative sentences for offenses within a single transaction5 4 Finally, the court viewed the limitation on punishment contained in
the single transaction rule as a small price to pay for the prosecutorial flexibility resulting from the increased number of statutory offenses. 55
The single transaction rule represents a necessary and salutary restraint on
judicial discretion in sentencing. The proper function of judicial discretion is
to fit the punishment to the individual defendant within the parameters set
by the legislature. The instant court clearly delineated the operation of the
rule in preserving the delicate balance between judicial discretion and legislative intent in fixing criminal penalties.
Respect for legislative intent, however, should not be dependent solely
upon the judicial presumption of the single transaction rule. Although the
courts must be credited for having developed and implemented the rule, its
importance is such that it should be given statutory form.56 In this way legislative intent could be explicitly stated, and the single transaction rule could
more effectively and consistently serve to prevent the imposition of excessive
sentences.
Even in the absence of a statutory formulation, the single transaction rule
in Florida is an indispensable and humanitarian protection for the criminal
defendant. The clarification and support given the rule by the instant court
further underscores its true importance. Society can ill afford to impose arbitrary or excessive sentences on those whose conduct it purports to correct.
NORMAN

L.

HULL

52. Id. at 453.
53. Id. at 450.
54. Id. at 453. The court thus stressed again the distinction between conviction and
sentencing for crimes within a single transaction.
55. Id.
56. See generally Comment, supra note 13. The misdirection in the district courts of
appeal prior to the instant case could have been avoided altogether by an adequately worded
statute. Such a statute should also attempt to define a "single transaction." A statute that
would accomplish both purposes is exemplified by the recently enacted Illinois Provision:
"The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for offenses which were committed as part
of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the nature
of the criminal objective .... " ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §1005-8-4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1973). This
statute echoes the Florida single transaction rule. Its enactment in Florida would not preclude cumulative punishment of crimes that were not necessary or incidental to the accomplishment of a given criminal objective. See People v. Smith, 6 Ill. App. 3d 259, 285
N.E.2d 460 (1972), indicating that the recent Illinois statute is a codification of preexisting
decisional law. Furthermore, such a statute would not alter the spirit of present Florida decisional law. Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d 300, 305-06 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1973).
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